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Abstract. In this paper, we pursue a modelling approach to address security 
requirements for multi-agent systems (MAS). This will allow developers to 
account for both the system and agent-specific security requirements of a MAS 
during the requirements phase and throughout the whole Software Development 
Lifecycle of the system. We focus on autonomy, mobility and cooperation of 
individual agents and how these create additional security vulnerabilities to the 
system. In proposing a set of generic modelling primitives for these engendered 
requirements in the analysis of the MAS, we extend our recently proposed MAS 
metamodel. 
Keywords: Meta-modelling, modelling of Agent-Oriented Information Systems, 
modelling of security features, the act of modelling,  
1. Introduction 
Agents are highly autonomous, situated and interactive software components. They 
autonomously sense their environment and accordingly respond as they are enabled. In 
a given Multi-agent System (MAS), coordination and cooperation between agents 
possessing diverse knowledge and capabilities facilitate the achievement of global 
goals that cannot be otherwise achieved by a single agent working in isolation [1]. 
Autonomy of agents, cooperation amongst them and intensive communication between 
them incur additional security requirements for a MAS. Furthermore, agents are 
particularly useful in the engineering of open, distributed or heterogeneous systems. 
Indeed, agent technology is poised to exploit the pervasiveness of the internet and the 
availability of cheap computational power at its individual nodes and agents have 
already proved effective in varying tasks and in different organizational settings: 
automating management of information within businesses [2], e-commerce trading 
environments [3] and building computational models of human societies to study 
emergent behaviour [4]. 
We have developed and successfully evaluated a generic metamodel, called FAML 
(FAME1 Agent-oriented Modelling Language), to describe features of any MAS [5, 6]. 
FAML was designed to support a set of general concepts relevant to model any MAS. 
Some problem-specific concepts including security and mobility were initially omitted.  
The chosen concepts are designated into two sets: run-time concepts and design-time 
concepts. Each set has two scopes: system-related or agent internals related scope. 
                                                          
1 FAME (Framework for Agent-oriented Method Engineering) is the project name under which 
FAML has been developed. 
We recognize that the security requirements of a given MAS are either generic 
(applying to any software), application-related (part of the functional requirement) or 
MAS-specific (due to their engendered properties).  This paper describes an effort to 
complement our existing MAS metamodel, FAML, with the capacity to model the 
security requirements of any given MAS. We further recognize that these security 
requirements are of two kinds: system security requirements and agent-specific security 
requirements. The former applies to all agents in the system while the latter applies at 
the level of the individual agent. In this paper, we analyze the design tradeoffs in 
accommodating both the system and agent-specific MAS security requirements, but we 
focus more on modelling the former.  
Our work is not the first to consider modelling of security issues of multi-agent 
systems, example of others are [7-10]. However, our work is unique in that it 
simultaneousely focuses on three important properties of a software agent: autonomy, 
mobility and cooperation. Although these properties are important for many agent 
systems, particularly those in situations where security is paramount, the above 
approaches do not consider all of them at the same time. Most related to our suggested 
approach is that of Mouratidis et al. [11] on the definition of an architectural 
description language (ADL) to specify secure multi-agent systems. This work proposes 
a set of design primitives conceptualized using the Z specification language to capture 
a "core" architectural model to build secure MAS architectures. However, this work 
differs from our approach in two ways: firstly, it does not consider mobility and, 
secondly, as its authors state, it lacks a suitable set of core abstractions, inspired by 
organizational metaphors, to be used during the design of the secure multi-agent 
system architecture. Therefore, we believe that our work complements [11] by 
providing the missing set of core abstractions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our analytic 
process used to identify the required security modelling units.  Section 3 articulates the 
MAS-specific security concerns of any MAS and associates these with basic modelling 
primitives. It shows our existing MAS metamodel extended to incorporate the 
identified units. Section 4 discusses the proposed metamodel while Section 5 concludes 
with a discussion of future work.  
2. A Security metamodel for MAS 
We are advocating a software modelling approach to address security requirements of 
multi-agent systems, as suggested in recent work e.g. [12, 13]. This allows developers 
to account for security of a MAS early during the development of the system rather 
than as a costly afterthought. Our work in this paper is a step towards a coherent 
approach to provide methodological support for the creation of secure MASs. We 
systematically start the synthesis of a set of modelling units (classes in the metamodel) 
required to model the security of a MAS. Our systematic approach to the synthesis 
justifies why each unit is needed. In particular, our approach is to find a minimal set of 
modelling units to model the MAS-specific security requirements, identified by the 
MAS developer during design stage, and a number of security actions, performed by 
the MAS during run-time to satisfy the system’s security requirement. We conduct our 
analysis along two dimensions: the inherent attributes of agents in a MAS and an 
increasing scale of security risk (see Table 1). Modelling unit sets associated with 
various attributes may overlap. The context complexity ranges from a single agent on a 
single machine to a fully mobile MAS with agents capable of roaming the net using 
dynamic multi-hop routing. An agent can be strongly mobile, where it carries its code, 
data and its state of execution (i.e. program counter and CPU registers); or it can be 
weakly mobile, carrying code and data only. We start our analysis in the least risky 
environment (a single agent on a single machine). We aim to extend this to overcome 
its limitations in increasingly risky settings until we have a complete security model 
that can represent all security requirements and solutions for the riskiest setting.  
We identified in total nine different levels of vulnerabilities as shown in Table 1. 
The agent vulnerability level increases as we move from level 0 to level 8.  
Consequently the need for protection such as encryption also increases the further we 
move away from level 0. In the case of Level 2, data is transported (for message 
passing) while, for Level 3, both data and code may be transported (for remote 
evaluation), which allows application level attacks. Beyond Level 3, distributed MAS 
systems solutions will no longer be viable. It becomes more complex to ensure safe 
transportation when states of execution are involved or when intermediate cooperation 
is not guaranteed (hostile hosts may be encountered - this is not the case for distributed 
systems). The scale of vulnerabilities, as shown in Table 1, delineates the research 
issues at each level of complexity and can be used as a research roadmap to fulfil 
MAS-specific security requirements of the most complex forms of MAS. 
We seek to model features required for non-mediated decentralized security, 
without having to mediate interactions between agents by trusted secure agents. The 
mediated approach to security e.g. in [3] assumes two classes of agents, internal and 
external, and by-passes many security problems by having the internal secure agents 
mediate all interactions between external non-secure agents. The mediated approach 
limits the potential of a MAS and can secure MASs only up to Level 2 (Table 1), 
where internal agents reside in a central server (Level 1) and where external agents 
send messages to the central location of internal agents. Our approach will be more 
general than the mediated approach. 
Table 1. Context Complexity of MAS 
Vulnerability 
level 
Description of Context Complexity Level 
0 A single agent system on a single machine.  
1 MAS running on a single machine– controlling access to 
agents’ resources during cooperation   
2 Distributed MAS (same as MAS if communication is secured) 
3 Weakly mobile agents with single hops 
4 Strongly mobile agents with single hops 
5 Weakly mobile agents with fixed multiple hops 
6 Weakly mobile agents with dynamic multiple hops 
7 Strongly mobile agents with fixed multiple hops 
8 Strongly mobile and roaming agents 
 
We note that agent security requirements for communication channels are 
equivalent to normal requirements for confidentiality, integrity, authentication and 
availability in a typical software application [14]. MAS-specific security problems do 
not include security of communication channels. Our security framework strives for 
authenticated communication between agents (including mobile agents), where any 
receiving agent can ascertain the identity of the sender and can choose to block an 
agent as it sees fit. Any agent can also deny/offer access to its owned resources 
(including its internal state) at any time it wishes. Resources that need to be protected 
can be local (owned by a single agent) or global (owned by many agents), distributed 
or reside on a single device.  
Our security framework is integrated into our generic MAS metamodel, FAML 
which can be used to represent workproducts of any MAS methodology. We extend 
FAML in the next section to ensure that any secured workproduct (one which takes 
into account security requirements) can also be represented.  
3. General MAS Security Vulnerabilities 
In this section, we  establish the analytic process to identify modelling units that 
software engineers can use to describe security requirements that are common to all 
multi-agent systems (and to any agent within any multi-agent system). We overview 
the general security requirements associated with the features of agents of cooperation, 
mobility and autonomy. We note basic modelling units to express these requirements. 
Our concerns are authentication and resource access control. More specifically, we are 
concerned with modelling features of agent interactions and with additional data 
structures to provide secure access and detection as well as recovery in the case of a 
security violation.  For our purpose we assume messages are transmitted over secured 
communication channels, since interception problems are not MAS-specific. Our 
analysis is a first step to extending our existing MAS metamodel [6]. The extended 
metamodel, FAML, will retain the same structure. It will still have two layers: design-
time and runtime layers and each layer will still have two scopes: agent-related and 
system related. However, each of the four layers+scopes will be extended to 
accommodate the general security requirements associated with the engendered 
properties of agents: cooperation, autonomy and mobility. In the rest of this section, we 
identify security modelling units associated with the each of those properties. The 
integration of these units into FAML is presented later in Section 4.   
3.1. Cooperation, autonomy and security of agents 
Cooperation between agents in a MAS requires mutual agreement between agents 
to share resources and, in some instances, to share access to their internal states [1]. To 
simplify our current analysis, we assume that agents’ resources are localized with the 
agent and that any resource is owned by only one agent.  The broader the mutually 
agreed access to resources and internal states is, the richer the functionality of the 
system potentially becomes. It is essential for agents to be able to trust other agents in 
order to provide a broad set of interactions. To implement an agreement to share access 
to resources and internal states between agents, i.e. to cooperate, it is critical for agents 
to discern changes in their states or resource arising from a legitimate access, and from 
changes arising from malicious intrusion. A way to achieve this is for each message to 
be uniquely associated with an agent identity and time stamped. We include 
agent_identity as a basic modelling unit to describe an agent uniquely. This identity can 
be a function of the system to which an agent belongs, serving as a fingerprint of any 
agent created in any MAS. A higher level security concept, signature, can be 
implemented using agent_identity. A signature is to be known by trusted parties and 
producible by a relevant identity [16]. Our extended metamodel will also describe the 
relation between agents and their resources through ownership and usage relationships.  
To maintain its autonomy, an agent should be resilient and able to recover from an 
interaction that gives access to resources when it shouldn’t. In other words, 
maintaining some state description of its past interactions is required. Each agent 
should have an interaction_history log to allow recovery. Such a log is only accessible 
to the agent itself This concept along with ownership secures the internal state of agent, 
which can then cooperate to reinstate its state as well as the state of the MAS if and 
when needed. Mediated systems e.g. [17] use a system interaction history, but this 
requires centralized access, which we avoid since it places limits on the mobility of 
agents. Our decentralized framework can model a mediated solution by having a single 
agent designated to mediate and to interact with all other agents. The interactions log of 
the ‘mediator-designate’ will then be a log of all interactions within the system, as in 
[17].   
3.2. Mobility and security of agents 
Mobility allows agents to replace remote procedure calls, saving on bandwidth and 
allowing computations that otherwise are not possible. In comparison with traditional 
distributed systems, mobility allows additional functionality for a MAS but also incurs 
additional security requirements. Mobility of agents varies, as noted in Table 1. For 
weakly mobile agents, discerning intrusion is easier, since the agent starts execution 
from scratch when it reaches its host. The essential problem with mobile agents is 
compounded by the fact that the host may require access to agent execution states [18]. 
Hence, if the host is malicious, intrusion recovery is needed.  
Assuming that an agent is transmitted safely along a channel, threats to an agent 
(mobile or non-mobile) resources come from interacting with at least the following 
sources: (i) individual or group of agents in its environment - for example, one or more 
mobile malicious agents designed to steal or corrupt data; (ii) the host: the host that 
controls its execution could mistake the identity of the agent or it may simply be a 
malicious luring host; (iii) users themselves: unauthorized users might attempt to 
corrupt or steal an agent’s data, or attempt to infiltrate the functionality of the MAS. 
The extent of the vulnerability of a mobile agent depends on the freedom it has with 
respect to its mobility. Mobility can be single hop (from host to another without any 
intermediate hosts) versus multiple hop (one or many intermediate hosts) or fixed 
(travel path is fixed and statically decided) versus dynamic (path is decided by agent as 
it travels, it is said to be roaming) (see Table 1). Mobility requires the location 
modelling unit so that an agent is able to reason about its movements. Combined with 
its interaction_history (history of hops as well for mobile agents), it can reinstate itself 
into a safer location if it is under attack.   
4. Proposed Metamodel  
We recognize in this paper that MAS-specific security requirements are either generic, 
application-related or MAS-specific. In Section 3, our focus was on the third kind 
engendered by the inherent characteristics of agents and MASs. This suggested a 
number of new modelling units, which we integrate into FAML concepts in this 
section. We first give the complete set of the new security FAML concepts, together 
with their corresponding strict definitions. The new security design-time concepts with 
their definitions are: 
! Agent-specific Security Requirement: Security requirements specific to an 
individual agent 
! Location Specification: Information about places where an agent can reside 
within the system 
! Plan Resources Specification: Specification of resources used in the Plan 
Specification 
! Private Resources Specification: Specification of resources only visible and 
available to the individual agent 
! Recover Action Specification: Specification of an action  undertaken for the 
specific purpose of recovery from an intrusion or security breach event.  For 
example, an agent can use the interaction log to reinstate its state as well as part 
of the state of the MAS if an interaction gives access to resources when it 
shouldn’t 
! Relocate Action Specification: An agent can move to another location based on 
information contained in the interaction log and agent-location if an interaction 
gives access to resources when it shouldn’t 
! Resource Specification: Something that has a name, may have reasonable 
representations and which can owned. The ownership of a resource is 
connected with the right to set policy on the resource  
! Security Action Specification: Action that an agent takes if an interaction gives 
access to resources when it shouldn’t 
! Security Requirement: A desirable security-related property that constrains 
functional requirement(s) 
! System Security Requirement: Security requirements that are true for all agents 
of the MAS 
 
The new security run-time concepts and their definitions are: 
! Location: Information about places where an agent can reside within the 
system 
! Plan Resources: An organised collection of resources used in the Plan 
Specification 
! Private Resource: Resources only visible and available to the individual agent 
e.g. agent’s history log of hops as well as interactions with other mobile agents 
! Public Resource: Resource that is used by one or more agents in the system e.g. 
database resource 
! Recover Action: An agent can use the interaction log to reinstate its state as 
well as the state of the MAS if an interaction gives access to resources when it 
shouldn’t 
! Relocate Action: An agent can move to another location based on information 
contained in the interaction log and agent-location if an interaction gives access 
to resources when it shouldn’t 
! Resource: Something that has a name, may have reasonable representations 
and which can owned. The ownership of a resource is connected with the right 
to set policy on the resource. (http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-arch/#resource) 
! Security Action: Action that an agent takes if an interaction gives access to 
resources when it shouldn’t 
It is worth mentioning that we distinguish between run-time security modelling 
units  and design-time security modelling units (shown above). In terms of security, 
this means that we effectively differentiate between security requirements, which are 
modelled by the software developer during the design stage, and security actions, 
which are performed by the multi-agent system during the run-time to satisfy the 
security requirements. Such differentiation allows, on the one hand, the development of 
a security-aware platform independent design; and, on the other hand, the realization of 
a working security-aware multi-agent system for a specific platform.   
We present the extended FAML in four diagrams to integrate the security 
modelling units into the same existing areas of concern for FAML (Fig. 1-4): design-
time system related, runtime system-related (environment), design-time agent-internals 
and runtime agent-internals area of concern. Note that each agent assumes 
responsibility for its security; this is modelled with Recover Action Specification (Fig. 
2).  An example recovery action may be what the agent does to use the interaction log 
to reinstate its state and perhaps assist in reinstating of the MAS if an interaction gives 
access to resources when it shouldn’t. This is a refinement of a more general modelling 
unit, Security Action Specification.  FAML is extended with modelling units to express 
mobility behaviour of agents with the units Relocate Action Specification and Location 
Specification. Relocating is a restricted action that requires access to secured resources 
of the agents (i.e. only the agent can relocate itself). 
 
Fig. 1. System-level classes (Duplication of the Role is only to simplify the layout) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Agent definition-level classes at design time  
Our security framework is underpinned by recognizing and modelling the status of 
access to resources during the development. In the extended FAML, the modelling 
units Private Resource and Public Resource are added (Fig. 3). Private resources are 
agent-specific including logs of hops and interactions with other mobile agents. 
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Fig. 3. Environment-level classes 
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Fig. 4. Agent-level classes at run time 
At runtime, central to agent security are authentication and recovery when that fails. 
Therefore at the agent-runtime scope (shown in Fig. 4), FAML is extended with the 
modelling units to represent the various classes of resources and their access (the same 
as agent-design time taxonomy of resources). In addition, it is extended to enable 
modelling of restricted actions. 
5. Conclusions and Future work 
FAML to any MAS is similar to UML to any OO system. It is a product metamodel 
allowing the representation of any workproduct during the development of a MAS. Our 
original FAML did not accommodate the security requirements of the system, and it 
did not allow description of security solutions such as the ones discussed in this paper. 
The extended FAML presented in this paper will allow software developers to describe 
security solutions and produce secured workproducts as the system is developed.  In 
extending it to represent secured workproducts, we preserve its structure.  
In our security framework, managing the MAS-specific security requirements is 
decentralized and is relegated to the individual agents forming the system.  There are 
still a few outstanding questions with respect to modelling units so far identified e.g. 
can agents themselves be owned? Further work is required to complete our set of 
security modelling units. For example, we still need to identify what (if any) additional 
modelling units are required for mobile agents with dynamic routing. It should be 
noted that these units alone (even when completed) would not suffice to model all 
security features, although out of these basic units, and clever programming, more 
complex concepts can be derived such as access level, authority levels, passports, 
signatures, worth of resources.  
When our MAS existing metamodel [6] is completed with most of its required 
security features, we will start verifying it by applying it to the analysis of security 
requirements of a community-based peer-to-peer web search engine. We envisage that 
fulfilling the highest levels of complexity will be particularly challenging. 
Hence, we will overlap verification with the development of the security-enhanced 
metamodel described here. Our future work will also link the development of secure 
MASs and their related access policies with risk management standards (e.g. 
ISO17799, ISO7498/2) as applied at an organizational level. This would guide MAS 
developers in making inevitable tradeoff decisions of security versus cost and 
functionality. Authentication, intrusion detection and recovery require more 
computation and storage of relevant features of the involved interactions and resources 
by each agent. Diverting too many resources (e.g. storage, computation) towards 
security may indirectly limit the functionality of the system. Investing in reducing 
security has a point of diminishing returns, most of the benefits being reaped with the 
first chunk of the cost. In future work, we will guide developers in tackling such 
complex tradeoff decisions.  
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